Robust High-Dimensional Linear Regression by Liu, Chang et al.
Robust High-Dimensional Linear Regression
Chang Liu
University of Maryland
liuchang@cs.umd.edu
Bo Li
Vanderbilt University
bo.li.2@vanderbilt.edu
Yevgeniy Vorobeychik
Vanderbilt University
yevgeniy.vorobeychik@vanderbilt.edu
Alina Oprea
Northeastern University
a.oprea@ccs.neu.edu
Abstract
The effectiveness of supervised learning techniques has made them ubiquitous
in research and practice. In high-dimensional settings, supervised learning com-
monly relies on dimensionality reduction to improve performance and identify
the most important factors in predicting outcomes. However, the economic im-
portance of learning has made it a natural target for adversarial manipulation of
training data, which we term poisoning attacks. Prior approaches to dealing with
robust supervised learning rely on strong assumptions about the nature of the fea-
ture matrix, such as feature independence and sub-Gaussian noise with low vari-
ance. We propose an integrated method for robust regression that relaxes these
assumptions, assuming only that the feature matrix can be well approximated
by a low-rank matrix. Our techniques integrate improved robust low-rank ma-
trix approximation and robust principle component regression, and yield strong
performance guarantees. Moreover, we experimentally show that our methods
significantly outperform state of the art both in running time and prediction error.
1 Introduction
Machine learning has come to be widely deployed in a broad array of applications. An important
class of applications of machine learning uses it to enable scalable security solutions, such as spam
filtering, traffic analysis, and fraud detection [1, 2, 3]. In these applications, reliability of the ma-
chine learning system is crucial to ensure service quality and enforce security, but strong incentives
exist to reduce learning efficacy (e.g., to bypass spam filters). Indeed, recent research demonstrates
that existing systems are vulnerable in the presense of adversaries who can manipulate either the
training (i.e. the poisoning attack) or test data (i.e. the evasion attack) [4, 5, 6, 7]. Consequently,
an important agenda in machine learning research is to develop learning algorithms that are robust
to data manipulation. In this work, we focus on designing supervised learning algorithms that are
robust to poisoning attacks.
Existing research on robust machine learning dates back to algorithms for robust PCA [8]. Most
of them assume that a portion of the underlying dataset is randomly, rather than adversarially, cor-
rupted. Recently, Chen et al. [9] and Feng et al. [10] considered recovery strategy when the corrup-
tion is adversarially chosen to achieve some malicious goal. The former considers a robust linear and
the latter logistic regression models. However, both make an extremely strong assumption that each
feature is sub-Gaussian with vanishing variance (as O( 1n )) and features are independent, rendering
them impractical and severely limiting the scope of associated theoretical guarantees.
In this work, we propose a novel algorithmic framework for making linear regression robust to data
poisoning. Our framework does not require either sub-Gaussian or independence assumptions on
the feature matrix X. Instead, we assume that X is generated through adversarial corruption of an
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approximately low-rank matrix. Our goal is to make regression which uses dimensionality reduction,
such as PCA, robust to adversarial manipulation. The technical challenge is two-fold: first, we must
make sure that the dimensionality reduction step can reliably recover the low-rank subspace, and
second, that the resulting regression performed on the subspace can recover sufficiently accurate
predictions, in both cases despite both noise and adversarial examples. While these problems have
previously been considered in isolation, ours is the first integrated approach. More significantly,
the effectiveness of our approach relies on weaker assumptions than prior art, and, as a result, our
proposed practical algorithms significantly outperform state-of-the-art alternatives.
Specifically, we assume that labels y are a linear function of the true feature matrix X? with additive
zero-mean noise. In addition, X? is corrupted with noise, and the adversary subsequently adds
a collection of corrupted rows to the training data. In this model, our approach involves two parts:
first, we develop a novel robust matrix factorization algorithm which correctly recovers the subspace
whenever this is possible, and second, a trimmed principle component regression, which uses the
recovered basis and trimmed optimization to estimate linear model parameters.
Our main contributions are as follows:
• Novel algorithm for robust matrix factorization: We develop a novel algorithm that
reliably recovers the low-rank subspace of the feature matrix despite both noise (about
which we make few assumptions) and adversarial examples. We prove that our algorithm
is effective iff subspace recovery is possible.
• Novel robust regression algorithm with significantly weaker assumptions: In contrast
to prior robust regression work, we do not require either feature independence or low-
variance sub-Gaussian distribution of features. We prove that our algorithm can reliably
learn the low-dimensional linear model despite data corruption and noise.
• Significant improvement in running time and accuracy: We present efficient algo-
rithms which significantly outperform prior art in running time and prediction efficacy.
Related Work: Robust PCA is widely used as a statistical tool for data analysis and dimensionality
reduction that is robust to i.i.d. noise [8]. However, these methods cannot deal with “malicious”
corruptions, where the sophisticated adversaries can manipulate rows from the subspace of the true
feature matrix. In contrast, our approach handles both noise and malicious corruption. Recently,
robust learning for several learning models, such as linear and logistic regression have also been
proposed [9, 10]. The limitation of these approaches is their assumption that the feature matrix is
sub-Gaussian with vanishing variance, and that features are independent. Our approach, in contrast,
only assumes that the true feature matrix (prior to corruption) is low rank. Yan et al. proposed an
outlier pursuit algorithm to deal with the matrix completion problem with corruptions [11], and a
similar algorithm is applied by Xu et al. to deal with the noisy version of feature matrix [12]. How-
ever, these methods only consider the matrix recovery problem and are not scalable. A more scalable
algorithm based on the alternating minimization approach was recently proposed by Rodriguez et
al. [13]; however, this method does not consider data noise or corruption. A number of heuristic
techniques have also been proposed for poisoning attacks [14, 15, 16] for other problems, such as
robust anomaly detection source identification.
2 Problem Setup and Solution Overview
We start with the pristine training dataset of n labeled examples, 〈X?, y?〉, which subsequently
suffers from two types of corruption: noise is added to feature vectors, and the adversary adds n1
malicious examples (feature vectors and labels) to best mislead the learning. We assume that the
adversary has full knowledge of the learning algorithm. The learner’s goal is to learn a model on the
corrupted dataset which is similar to the true model. The feature space is high-dimensional, and the
learner will perform dimensionality reduction prior to learning. In particular, we assume that X? is
low-rank with a basis B, and we assume that the true model is the associated low-dimensional linear
regression.
Formally, observed training data is generated as follows:
1. Ground truth: y? = X?β? = Uβ?U , where β? is the true model, β?U is its low-dimensional
representation, and U = X?B is the low-dimensional embedding of X?.
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2. Noise: X0 = X? + N, where N is a noise matrix with ‖N‖∞ ≤ ; y0 = y? + e, where e is
i.i.d. zero-mean Gaussian noise with variance σ.
3. Corruption: The attacker adds n1 adversarially crafted examples (xa, ya) to get 〈X, y〉,
which maximally skews prediction performance of low-dimensional linear regression.
To formally characterize how well the learner performs in this setting, we define (1) a model function
f(X0, y0) which is the model learned on 〈X?, y?〉; (2) a loss function l; and (3) a threshold function
δ(z) which takes as input z > 1, and is increasing in z. Our metric is (f, l, δ)-tolerance:
Definition 1 ((f, l, δ)-tolerance). We say that learner L is (f, l, δ)-tolerant, if for any attacker, and
any z > 1, we have l(L(X, y), f(X0, y0)) ≤ δ(z) with probability at least 1 − c1z−c2 , for some
constant c1, c2 > 0.
In our setting, f(X0, y0) return β? and l is expected quadratic loss Ex
[
(x(β
∧
− β?))2].
For convenience, we letO denote the set of (unknown) indices of the samples in X coming from X0
and A = {1, ..., n + n1} − O the set of indices for adversarial samples in X. For an index set I
and matrix M , MI denotes the sub-matrix containing only rows in I; similar notation is used for
vectors. We define γ = n1n as the corruption ratio, or the ratio of corrupted and pristine data.
2.1 Solution overview and paper organization
Our goal is to design a learner L to estimate the coefficients β
∧
of the true model β? using low-
dimensional embedding of a high-dimensional model. We achieve this goal in two steps: (1) re-
cover the subspace B of X?; (2) project X onto B, and estimate β
∧
using robust principle component
regression. The key challenge is that an adversary can design corrupted data to interfere both with
the first and second step of the process.
For the first step (Section 3), we develop a robust subspace recovery algorithm which can account
for both noise N and adversarial examples in correctly recovering the subspace of X?. We character-
ize necessary and sufficient conditions for successful subspace recovery, showing that our algorithm
succeeds whenever recovery is possible. The challenge in the second step (Section 4) is that the
adversary can construct XA from the same subspace as X?, but with the different distribution of
〈XA, yA〉 from 〈X?, y?〉. To address this, we propose the trimmed principle component regression
algorithm to minimize the loss function over only a subset of the dataset ensuring that the adversary
can have only a limited impact by adding n1 arbitrary corrupted samples without having these in-
stances being discarded. Our theoretical results demonstrate that the combined approach is (f, l, δ)-
tolerant learning algorithm. Finally, in Section 5, we present an efficient practical implementation
of our methods, which we evaluate in Section 6.
In our analysis, we use the corruption parameter n1 and the rank k of the low-dimensional em-
bedding to characterize the theoretical results. In our experiments, however, we show that we only
require a lower bound on n1 and an upper bound on k for our techniques to work.
3 Robust Subspace Recovery
In this section, we discuss how to recover the low-rank subspace of X? from X. Our goal is to exactly
recover the low-rank subspace, i.e., returning a basis for X?. We show sufficient and necessary
conditions for this problem to be solvable, and provide algorithms when this is possible. As a
warmup, we first discuss the noise-free version of the problem, and then present our results for the
problem with noises. Proofs of the theorems presented in this section can be found in Appendix A.
Formally, we consider the following problem:
Problem Definition 1 (Subspace Recovery). Design an algorithm Lrecovery, which takes as input X,
and returns a set of vectors B which form the basis of X?.
3.1 Warmup: Noise-free Subspace Recovery
We first consider an easier version of Problem 1 with N = 0. In this case, we know that XO = X?.
We assume that we know rank(X?) = k (or have an upper bound on it). Below we demonstrate
that there exists a sharp threshold θ on n1 such that whenever n1 < θ, we can solve Problem 1
exactly with high probability, whereas if n1 ≥ θ, Problem 1 cannot be solved. To characterize this
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threshold, we define the cardinality of the maximal rank k− 1 subspaceMSk−1(X?) as the optimal
value of the following problem:
max
I
|I| s.t. rank(XI? ) ≤ k − 1
Intuitively, the adversary can insert n1 = n−MSk−1(X?) samples to form a rank k subspace, which
does not span X?. The following theorem shows that in this case, there is indeed no learner that can
successfully recover the subspace of X?.
Theorem 1. If n1 +MSk−1(X?) ≥ n, then there exists an adversary such that no algorithm Lrecover
solves Problem 1 with probability greater than 1/2.
On the other hand, when n1 is below this threshold, we can use the following simple algorithm to
recover the subspace of X?:
Algorithm 1 Exact recover algorithm for Problem 1 (Noisy-free)
We search for a subset I of indices, such that |I| = n, and rank(XI) = k
return a basis of XI .
In fact, we can prove the following theorem.
Theorem 2. If n1 +MSk−1(X?) < n, then Algorithm 1 solves Problem 1 for any adversary.
Theorems 1 and 2 together give the necessary and sufficient conditions on when Problem 1 is solv-
able, and Algorithm 1 provides a solution. We further show an implication of these theorems on the
corruption ratio γ. We can prove that MSk−1(X?) ≥ k − 1 (see Appendix A). Combining this with
Theorem 1, we can have the following upper bound on γ.
Corollary 1. If γ ≥ 1− k−1n , then Problem 1 cannot be solved.
3.2 Dealing with Noise
We now consider Problem 1 with noise. Before we discuss the adversary, we first need to assume
that the uncorrupted version is solvable. In particular, we assume that X? optimizes the following
problem:
min
X′
||X0 − X′|| (1a)
s.t. rank(X′) ≤ k. (1b)
Without otherwise mentioned, we use || · || to denote the Frobenius norm. We put no additional
restrictions on N except above. Note that this assumption is implied by the classical PCA prob-
lem [17, 18, 19]. We want to emphasize on the optimal value of the above problem. We denote
this value to be noise residual, denoted as NR(X0) = N. Noise residual is a key component to
characterize the necessary and sufficient condition for the solvability of Problem 1.
Characterization of the defender’s ability to accurately recover the true basis B of X? after the
attacker adds n1 malicious instances stems from the attacker’s ability to mislead the defender into
thinking that some other basis, B¯, better represents X?. Intuitively, since the defender does not know
X0, X?, or which n1 rows of the data matrix X are adversarial, this comes down to the ability to
identify the n − n1 rows that correspond to the correct basis (note that it will suffice to obtain the
correct basis even if some adversarial rows are used, since the adversary may be forced to align
malicious examples with the correct basis to evade explicit detection). As we show below, whether
the defender can succeed is determined by the relationship between the noise residual NR(X0) and
sub-matrix residual, denoted as SR(X0), which we define as the value optimizing the following
problem:
min
I,B,U
||XI0 − UB¯|| (2a)
s.t. rank(B¯) = k, B¯B¯T = Ik,X?B¯
T B¯ 6= X? (2b)
I ⊆ {1, 2, ..., n}, |I| = n− n1. (2c)
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We now explain the above optimization problem. U and B¯ are n× k and k×m matrixes separately.
Here B¯ is a basis which the attacker “targets”; for convenience, we require B¯ to be orthogonal (i.e.,
B¯B¯T = Ik). Since the attacker succeeds only if they can induce a basis different from the true
B, we require that B¯ does not span of X?, which is equivalent to saying X?B¯
T B¯ 6= X?. Thus, this
optimization problem seeks n−n1 rows of X?, where I is the corresponding index set. The objective
is to minimize the distance between XI0 and the span space of the target basis B¯, (i.e., ||XI0 −UB¯||).
Algorithm 2 Exact recovery algorithm for Problem 1
Solve the following optimization problem and get I.
minI,L ||XI − L||
s.t. rank(L) ≤ k, I ⊆ {1, ..., n+ n1}, |I| = n (3)
return a basis of XI .
To understand the importance of SR(X0), consider Algorithm 2 for recovering the basis of X?, B.
If the optimal objective value of optimization problem (2), SR(X0), exceeds the noise NR(X0),
it follows that the defender can obtain the correct basis B using Algorithm 2, as it yields a better
low-rank approximation of X than any other basis. Else, it is, indeed, possible for the adversary to
induce an incorrect choice of basis. The following theorem formalizes this argument.
Theorem 3. If SR(X0) ≤ NR(X0), then no algorithm recovers the exact subspace of X? with
probability greater than 1/2. If SR(X0) > NR(X0), then Algorithm 2 solves Problem 1.
To draw connection between the noisy case and the noise-free case, we can view Theorem 1 and 2
as special cases of Theorem 3.
Theorem 4. When N = 0, SR(X0) > NR(X0) = 0 if and only if n1 +MSk−1(X?) < n.
4 Trimmed Principal Component Regression
In this section, we present trimmed principal component regression (T-PCR) algorithm. The key
idea is to leverage the principal component regression (PCR) approach to estimate β
∧
, but during the
process trimming out those malicious samples that try to deviate the estimator from the true ones.
In the following, we present the approach, which is similar to the standard PCR approach, though
we do not require computing the exact singular vectors of X?.
Assume we recover a basis B of X?. Without loss of generality, we assume that B is an orthogonal
basis of k row vectors. Since B is a basis for X?, we assume X? = U?B. Then we know that,
by optimization (1), U? = argminU ||X0 − UB||. We compute U = argminU ||X − UB||, and, by
definition, we know U? = UO. By OLS estimator, we know that UT = (BBT )−1BXT , and thus
U = XBT .
To estimate y = X?β + e, we assume βU = Bβ. Since X? = U?B, we convert the estimation
problem of β from a high dimensional space to the estimation problem of βU from a low dimensional
space, such that y = UβU + e. After estimating for βU
∧
, we can convert it back to get β
∧
= BβU
∧
.
Notice that this is similar to principal component regression [20].
However, the adversary may corrupt n1 rows in U to fool the learner to make a wrong estimation
on βU
∧
, and thus on β
∧
. To mitigate this problem, we design Algorithm 3. Intuitively, during the
training process, we trim out the top n1 samples that maximize the difference between the observed
response yi and the predicted response uiβU , where ui denotes the i-th row of U . Since we know
the variances of these differences are small (i.e., recall Section 2, σ is the variance of the random
noise y − xβ?), these samples corresponding to the largest differences are more likely to be the
adversarial ones.
Next, we theoretically bound the prediction differences between our model and the linear regression
model learnt on X?, y?.
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Algorithm 3 Trimmed Principal Component Regression
Input: X, y
1. Use Algorithm 2 to compute a basis from X, and orthogonalize it to get B
2. Project X onto the span space of B and get U← XBT
3. Solve the following minimization problem to get βU
∧
min
βU
n∑
j=1
{(yi − uiβU )2 for i = 1, ..., n+ n1}(j) (4)
where z(j) denotes the j-th smallest element in sequence z.
4. return β
∧
← BβU
∧
.
Lemma 1. Algorithm 3 returns β
∧
, such that for any real value h > 1 with at least 1 − ch−2
probability for some constant c, we have
Ex
[
(x(β
∧
− β?))2] ≤ 4σ2(1 +√ 1
1− γ
)2
log c (5)
We explain the intuition of this Lemma, and defers the detailed proof to Appendix B. If an adversary
wants to fool Algorithm 3, it needs to generate samples (ui, yi), such that the loss function (yi −
uiβU
∧
)2 is among the smallest n. Since for samples from X?, y?, there loss functions are already
bounded according to σ, the adversary does not have an ability to significantly skew the estimator.
In particular, if σ = 0, i.e., there is no error while generating y0 from X?, then the adversary can do
nothing when γ < 1, and thus the estimator is the same as the linear regression’s estimator on the
uncorrupted data.
As an immediate consequence of Lemma 1, we have
Theorem 5. Given δ(c) = 4σ2
(
1 +
√
1
1−γ
)2
log c, Algorithm 3 is (f, l, δ(c))-tolerant.
5 Practical Algorithms
Algorithms 1, 2, and 3 require enumerating a subset of indeces, and are thus all exponential time.
To make our approach practical, we develop efficient implementations of Algorithms 2 and 3.
5.1 Efficient Robust Subspace Recovery
Consider the objective function (3). Since rank(L) ≤ k, we can rewrite L = UBT where U’s and
B’s shapes are n× k, and m× k respectively. Therefore, we can rewrite objective (3) as
min
I,U,B
||XI − UBT || s.t. |I| = n
which is equivalent to
min
U,B
n∑
j=1
{||xi − uiBT || for i = 1, ..., n+ n1}(j) (6)
where xi and ui denote the ith row of X and U respectively. Solving Objective 6 can be done using
alternating minimization, which iteratively optimizes the objective for U and B while fixing the
other. Specifically, in the wth iteration, we optimize for the following two objectives:
Uw+1 = argminU ||X− U(Bw)T ||
Bw+1 = argminB
n∑
j=1
{||xi − uw+1i BT || for i = 1, ..., n+ n1}(j).
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Algorithm 4 Trimmed Optimization
1. Randomly assign τi ∈ {0, 1} for i = 1, ..., n+ n1, such that
∑n+n1
i=1 τi = n
2. Optimize θ(j+1) ← argminθ
∑n+n1
i=1 τ
(j)
i l(yi, fθ(j)(xi));
3. Compute ranki as the rank of l(yi, fθ(j+1)(x)) in the ascending order;
4. Set τ (j+1)i ← 1 for ranki ≤ n, and τ (j+1)i ← 0 otherwise;
5. Update j ← j + 1 and go to 2 if there exists i such that τ (j+1)i 6= τ (j)i ;
6. return θ(j).
Notice that the second step computes the entire U regardless of the sub-matrix restriction. This is
because we need the entire U to be computed to update B. The key challenge is to compute Bw+1 in
each iteration, which is, again, a trimmed optimization problem. The next section presents a scalable
solution for such problems.
5.2 Efficient Algorithm for Trimmed Optimization Problems
Both robust subspace recovery and optimizing for (4) rely on solving optimization problems in the
form
min
θ
n∑
j=1
{l(yi, fθ(xi)) for i = 1, ..., n+ n1}(j)
where fθ(xi) computes the prediction over xi using parameter θ, and l(·, ·) is the loss function. We
refer to such problems as trimmed optimization problems. It is easy to see that solving this problem
is equivalent to solving
minθ,τ1,...,τn+n1
∑n+n1
i=1 τil(yi, fθ(xi))
s.t. 0 ≤ τi ≤ 1,
∑n+n1
i=1 τi = n
We can use alternating minimization technique to solve this problem, by optimizing for θ, and τi
respectively. We present this in Algorithm 4. In particular, the algorithm iteratively seeks optimal
arguments for θ and τ1, ..., τn+n1 respectively. Optimizing for θ is a standard least square optimiza-
tion problem. When optimizing τ1, ..., τn+n1 , it is easy to see that τi = 1 if l(yi, fθ(xi)) is among
the largest n; and τi = 0 otherwise. Therefore, optimizing for τ1, ..., τn+n1 is a simple sorting step.
While this algorithm is not guaranteed to converge to a global optimal, in our evaluation,we observe
that a random start of τ typically yields near-optimal solutions.
The following theorem shows that the algorithm converges.
Theorem 6. Given a loss function l(y, fθ(x)) such that a lower bound exists, i.e.,
∃B.∀y, θ, x.l(y, fθ(x)) ≥ B, Algorithm 4 converges. That is, assuming `j =∑n+n1
i=1 τ
(j)
i l(yi, fθ(j)(xi)) is the loss after j-th iteration, then we have
lim
j→+∞
||lj+1 − lj || = 0
The proof can be found in Appendix C.
6 Experimental Results
We evaluate the proposed algorithms in comparison with state-of-the-art alternatives on synthetic
data. For the subspace recovery problem, we compare to two state-of-the-art approaches: Chen
et al. [21] and Xu et al. [12]. We compare the combined T-PCR algorithm with the recent robust
regression approach [9], and the standard ridge regression algorithm. For most experiments, we set
n+ n1 = 400 and m = 400. The only exception is that, when we evaluate of the impact of n+ n1
on runtime, we vary n + n1 from 1,000 to 8,000. We vary the rank k of X?, and n1. Results are
averages of 30 runs after dropping the largest and smallest values.
Data: For a given (k, n1), we generate X? as follows: sample two matrixes U,B with shape n× k
and k × m respectively, such that each element is sampled independently from N (0, 1), ensuring
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(a) (b) (c)
Figure 1: (a) Runtime, as a function of rank. (b) Runtime, as a function of the number of rows (n).
(c) Rate of correct identification of corrupted rows.
that both have rank k, and we set X? = UB. Next, we generate corruptions XA also as a low rank
matrix by generating UA and BA as above. For BA, we set the first half of BA by choosing k/2
rows of X?, and generating the remaining k/2 rows randomly, ensuring that B has rank k. We then
concatenate X? and XA = UABA and shuffle the rows. We do not add noise to X?, unless explicitly
stated. In doing so, we know that XA shares a common subspace of rank k/2 with X?, but the
two subspaces are still different. This approach of data generation is significantly more adversarial
than prior methods of generating adversarial instances, as we show below. To generate labels, we
generate a random β?, and y is then constructed as described in Section 2, where we apply the
method of Xiao et al. [4] to create adversarial labels.
Runtime: Figure 1(a) and (b) presents the runtime comparison results. Our approach is imple-
mented in Scala without any special optimization, and both [21] and [12] are implemented in Matlab
leveraging Matlab’s built-in optimizations for matrix operations. In Figure 1(a), we vary the rank
from 1 to 20, and fix n = 350, n1 = 50. Our algorithm is significantly faster than [21] and [12].
Figure 1(b) shows runtime as a function of n, rank and n1 are fixed to 20 and 50 respectively. We
can observe that scalability of [21] and [12] is quite poor in the size of the problem. In contrast, our
algorithm remains quite efficient (with running time under 25 seconds in all cases).
Identification rate of corrupted rows: Figure 1(c) presents the percentage of all corrupted rows
identified by the algorithms. We generate the data fixing intrinsic rank to be 10, and varying inserted
corruptions from 10 to 150, keeping the total data size to be 400. We evaluate our approach varying
algorithm parameter k from 10 to 20, and parameter n from 210 to 250. The results show that
our approach achieves 100% accuracy regardless of the chosen parameters as long as k is no less
than the intrinsic rank, and n is no bigger than the number of pristine rows. We also compare our
approach with prior work, [12] and [21], which are identical. We refer to both as Xu et al. [12]. We
can observe that the identification rate plummets for n1 ≥ 20, even though only 5% of the rows are
corrupted.
Error on noisy data: We add noise to X? to evaluate performance on noisy data. Since [21]
cannot handle noise, we only compare with [12]. On each element of X?, we add a noise sampled
from N (0, 0.01). Figure 2(a) and 2(b) show RMSE of the difference from recovered XO and the
true X?. This metric is used by [12] as well. We use the grayscale to denote the RMSE: lighter
color corresponds to smaller RMSE. On most test cases our algorithm successfully recovers the true
subspace, while [12] fails on most cases. Particularly, when n1 < 120, our approach can completely
recover the underlying low-rank matrix. When n1 increases, the condition SR(X0) > NR(X0)
might not hold true, and Theorem 3 says that no algorithm can recover the true subspace with
probability greater than 1/2. However, this theorem does not prevent our algorithm succeeding with
probability < 1/2, which is why we observe several white spots for high n1.
Robust Regression: We evaluate our T-PCR Algorithm 3 against the robust regression method
of Chen et al. [9], which is the only alternative method for linear regression robust to adversarial
data poisoning. As a baseline, we also present results for standard OLS linear regression with and
without adversarial instances (LR(O+A) and LR(O), respectively). Results are evaluated using a
ground truth test set not used for training. The results, shown in Figure 2(c), demonstrate that our
algorithm significantly outperforms the alternatives. Indeed, while robust regression of Chen et
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Figure 2: (a) and (b) compares RMSE for T-PCR (a) and Xu et al. [12] (b). (c) RMSE comparison
with robust regression (Chen et al. [9]) and non-robust baseline.
al. [9] does better than the non-robust baseline, our method works nearly as well as linear regression
without adversarial instances!
7 Conclusion
This paper considers the poisoning attack for linear regression problem with dimensionality reduc-
tion. We address the problem in two steps: 1) introducing a novel robust matrix factorization method
to recover the true subspace, and 2) novel robust principle component regression to prune adversarial
instances based on the basis recovered in step (1). We characterize necessary and sufficient condi-
tions for our approach to be successful in recovering the true subspace, and present a bound on
expected prediction loss compared to ground truth. Experimental results suggest that the proposed
approach is extremely effective, and significantly outperforms prior art.
References
[1] Ion Androutsopoulos, Georgios Paliouras, Vangelis Karkaletsis, Georgios Sakkis, Constan-
tine D Spyropoulos, and Panagiotis Stamatopoulos. Learning to filter spam e-mail: A compar-
ison of a naive bayesian and a memory-based approach. arXiv preprint cs/0009009, 2000.
[2] Philip K Chan and Salvatore J Stolfo. Toward scalable learning with non-uniform class and
cost distributions: A case study in credit card fraud detection. In KDD, volume 1998, pages
164–168, 1998.
[3] Salvatore Stolfo, David W Fan, Wenke Lee, Andreas Prodromidis, and P Chan. Credit card
fraud detection using meta-learning: Issues and initial results. In AAAI-97 Workshop on Fraud
Detection and Risk Management, 1997.
[4] Huang Xiao, Battista Biggio, Gavin Brown, Giorgio Fumera, Claudia Eckert, and Fabio Roli.
Is feature selection secure against training data poisoning? In Proceedings of the 32nd Inter-
national Conference on Machine Learning (ICML-15), pages 1689–1698, 2015.
[5] Daniel Lowd and Christopher Meek. Adversarial learning. In Proceedings of the eleventh
ACM SIGKDD international conference on Knowledge discovery in data mining, pages 641–
647. ACM, 2005.
[6] Bo Li and Yevgeniy Vorobeychik. Feature cross-substitution in adversarial classification. In
Advances in Neural Information Processing Systems, pages 2087–2095, 2014.
[7] Bo Li and Yevgeniy Vorobeychik. Scalable optimization of randomized operational decisions
in adversarial classification settings. In AISTATS, 2015.
[8] Emmanuel J Cande`s, Xiaodong Li, Yi Ma, and John Wright. Robust principal component
analysis? Journal of the ACM (JACM), 58(3):11, 2011.
[9] Yudong Chen, Constantine Caramanis, and Shie Mannor. Robust high dimensional sparse
regression and matching pursuit. arXiv preprint arXiv:1301.2725, 2013.
[10] Jiashi Feng, Huan Xu, Shie Mannor, and Shuicheng Yan. Robust logistic regression and clas-
sification. In Advances in Neural Information Processing Systems, pages 253–261, 2014.
9
[11] Ming Yan, Yi Yang, and Stanley Osher. Exact low-rank matrix completion from sparsely
corrupted entries via adaptive outlier pursuit. Journal of Scientific Computing, 56(3):433–449,
2013.
[12] Huan Xu, Constantine Caramanis, and Sujay Sanghavi. Robust pca via outlier pursuit. In
Advances in Neural Information Processing Systems, pages 2496–2504, 2010.
[13] Paul Rodriguez and Brendt Wohlberg. Fast principal component pursuit via alternating min-
imization. In Image Processing (ICIP), 2013 20th IEEE International Conference on, pages
69–73. IEEE, 2013.
[14] Mauro Barni and Benedetta Tondi. Source distinguishability under corrupted training. In Infor-
mation Forensics and Security (WIFS), 2014 IEEE International Workshop on, pages 197–202.
IEEE, 2014.
[15] Benjamin IP Rubinstein, Blaine Nelson, Ling Huang, Anthony D Joseph, Shing-hon Lau,
Satish Rao, Nina Taft, and JD Tygar. Antidote: understanding and defending against poisoning
of anomaly detectors. In Proceedings of the 9th ACM SIGCOMM conference on Internet
measurement conference, pages 1–14. ACM, 2009.
[16] Battista Biggio, Igino Corona, Giorgio Fumera, Giorgio Giacinto, and Fabio Roli. Bagging
classifiers for fighting poisoning attacks in adversarial classification tasks. In Multiple Classi-
fier Systems, pages 350–359. Springer, 2011.
[17] Carl Eckart and Gale Young. The approximation of one matrix by another of lower rank.
Psychometrika, 1(3):211–218, 1936.
[18] Harold Hotelling. Analysis of a complex of statistical variables into principal components.
Journal of educational psychology, 24(6):417, 1933.
[19] Ian Jolliffe. Principal component analysis. Wiley Online Library, 2002.
[20] Ian T Jolliffe. A note on the use of principal components in regression. Applied Statistics,
pages 300–303, 1982.
[21] Yudong Chen, Huan Xu, Constantine Caramanis, and Sujay Sanghavi. Robust matrix comple-
tion and corrupted columns. In Proc. of ICML 11, 2011.
10
A Proof of Theorems in Section 3
Since, this section does not involve y, we will omit y without loss of clarity.
A.1 Theorem 1
Proof of Theorem 1. We prove by contradiction. Assume we have a learner Lrecover, can solve Prob-
lem 1 with probability more than 1/2. We want to show that there exist two different spaces of
rank-k, and one input X such that Lrecover(X1) should return both two spaces with a probability
> 1/2, which is impossible. In the following, we construct such two spaces. Particularly, we will
discuss how adversary can manipulate the matrix.
The adversary can choose I which maximize |I| such that while rank(XI? ) ≤ k − 1. We know|I| = MSk−1(X?) ≥ n− n1. This means that |O| − |I| ≤ n1.
Suppose v1, ..., vk−1 be a set of basis for the row space of XI? . The adversary then choose a vector
v′k which is orthogonal to X?. Then we know the span space of V ′ = {v1, ..., vk1 , v′k} is different
from X?. Then the adversary draws n1 samples from the span space of V ′, and insert them into X?
to form X. Moreover, we denote X′? to be a matrix of |I| + n1 rows, so that the first |I| rows are
XI? , and the rest n1 rows sampled by the adversary. Therefore, we know X
′
? is also a submatrix of
X, and we know that there are at most |O| − |I| ≤ n1 rows in X not coming from X′?.
In doing so, we know that X is constructed by corrupting X?. On the other hand, we can also see
X as the result of corrupting X′? by inserting |O| − |I| ≤ n1 rows. Therefore, Lrecover(X?) should
return both X? and X′? with a probability greater than 1/2, which is impossible. Therefore, our
conclusion holds true.
A.2 Theorem 2
Proof of Theorem 2. We show that Algorithm 1 recovers the subspace of X? exactly. Assume B is
returned by Algorithm 1 over X. We only need to show that B is a basis of X?. By Algorithm 1, we
know that B is a basis of n rows in I of X. Since we know any adversary can corrupt at most n1
rows, thus |I ∩A| ≤ n1. Therefore, by combining the assumption n1 +MSk−1(X?) < n, we know
that
|I ∩ O| = |I| − |I ∩ A| ≥ n− n1 > MSk−1(X?) (7)
Therefore, we know B is a basis for XI∩O? . By the definition of MSk−1(X?) and inequality (7), we
know that
rank(XI∩O? ) = k
Therefore, we know that XI∩O? is exactly the same subspace as X?, and thus B is the basis of X?.
A.3 Corollary 1
Lemma 2. MSk−1(X?) ≥ k − 1
Proof. We can choose the I = {1, ..., k − 1}, then we have rank(XI? ) ≤ k − 1. Therefore,
MSk−1(X?) ≥ |I| = k − 1.
Now, we can prove Corollary 1.
Proof of Corollary 1. Given n1n = γ ≥ 1− k−1n , we have
n1 + (k − 1) ≥ n
Combining MSk−1(X?) ≥ k − 1, we know
n1 +MSk−1(X?) ≥ n1 + (k − 1) ≥ n
Applying Theorem 1, we can conclude this corollary.
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A.4 Theorem 3
Proof of Theorem 3. The proof of this theorem is similar to the proof of Theorem 1 and 2. First,
when SR(X0) ≤ NR(X0), the adversary can construct X such that two subspaces should be recov-
ered with a probability greater than 1/2. Particularly, we assume I,U,B minimize objective 2, and
thus SR(X0) = ||XI0 − UB||. The adversary samples n1 rows Xcorrupt from the span space of B,
which does not belong to the span of X?. We add a small noise over Xcorrupt to get X1, such that
(1) Xcorrupt minimize ||X1 − Xcorrupt||; and (2) ||X1 − Xcorrupt|| = NR(X0) − SR(X0). Then the
adversary insert X1 into X0 to get X. In this case, we know that X? optimizes its distance from X0,
while the [XI? ; Xcorrupt] optimizes its distance from [X
I
0 ; Xcorrupt], where we use [A;B] to denote the
concatenation of rows from A and B respectively. Further, by definition, we know both of these two
distances is NR(X0). Therefore, the learner should recover from X both X? and [XI0 ; Xcorrupt] with
probability greater than 1/2. This is impossible! Therefore the first part of the theorem holds true.
For the second part, we follow the proof of Theorem 2 verbatim, and present the difference. We
show that Algorithm 2 recovers the subspace of X? exactly. Assume B is returned by Algorithm 2
over X. We only need to show that B is a basis of X?. By Algorithm 2, we know that B optimizes
its pan distance from a subset of n rows in X, which is denoted as I. Since we know any adversary
can corrupt at most n1 rows, thus |I ∩ A| ≤ n1. Therefore, we know that
|I ∩ O| = |I| − |I ∩ A| ≥ n− n1 (8)
If B is not a basis of X?, which means that X?BTB 6= X?, then we know that the distance between the
span space of B and XI∩O is greater than SR(X0) > NR(X0). This is impossible, since Algorithm 2
guarantees that this distance should be no greater than NR(X0). Contradiction! Therefore the
second part of the theorem holds true.
A.5 Theorem 4
Proof of Theorem 4. When N = 0, we know that SR(X0) > NR(X0) if and only if SR(X0) 6= 0.
This means that for any |I| = n− n1, XI? = UB implies that X?BTB = X? (condition (2b)), which
implies that rank(XI? |) = k for all I. Therefore, we knowMSk−1(X?) < n−n1, which concludes
this theorem.
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B Proof of Lemma 1
Proof. Assume βU
∧
is the solution for this optimization problem. We assume the adversary wants to
induce the regression system to compute βU
∧
. In this case, he has to corrupt γn rows in U . W.L.O.G.
we can assume O = {1, ..., n1}. We denote β?U = Bβ?. Since X? = U?B, we know that
y− X?β? = y− U?β?U
Since βU
∧
optimize Eq (4), we assume (yi − uiβU
∧
)2 are the smallest n values for i ∈ {1, ..., n}.
Then we have
n1∑
i=1
(yi − uiβU
∧
)2 +
n∑
i=n1+1
(yi − uiβU
∧
)2 ≤
n+n1∑
i=n1+1
(yi − uTi β?U )2
Therefore we have
n∑
i=n1+1
(yi − uiβU
∧
)2 ≤
n+n1∑
i=n1+1
(yi − uiβ?U )2 (9)
Further, we know
n∑
i=n1+1
(yi − uiβU
∧
)2
=
n∑
i=n1+1
(
(yi − uiβ?U ) + (uiβ?U − uiβU
∧
)
)2
≥
n∑
i=n1+1
{
(yi − uiβ?U )2 + (uiβ?U − uiβU
∧
)2 − 2|yi − uiβ?U | · |uiβ?U − uiβU
∧
|
}
=
n∑
i=n1+1
(yi − uiβ?U )2 +
n∑
i=n1+1
(ui(β
?
U − βU
∧
))2
−2
( n∑
i=n1+1
|ui(β?U − βU
∧
)| · |yi − uiβ?U |
)
(10)
According to Cauchy-Schwarz inequality, we have( n∑
i=n1+1
|ui(β?U − βU
∧
)| · |yi − uiβ?U |
)2
≤
( n∑
i=n1+1
(ui(β
?
U − βU
∧
))2
)
·
( n∑
i=n1+1
(yi − uiβ?U )2
)
We assume C =
√∑n
i=n1+1
(ui(β?U − βU
∧
))2), then, we have
−2
( n∑
i=n1+1
|ui(β?U − βU
∧
)| · |yi − uiβ?U |
)
≥ −2
√√√√( n∑
i=n1+1
(ui(β?U − βU
∧
))2
)
·
( n∑
i=n1+1
(yi − uiβ?U )2
)
= −2C
√
Σni=n1+1e
2
i
Substituting this inequality into (10) and combining with (9), we have
n+n1∑
i=n1+1
e2i ≥
n∑
i=n1+1
e2i + C
2 − 2C
√
Σni=n1+1e
2
i
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By simple rearrangement, we have
C2 − 2C
√√√√ n∑
i=n1+1
e2i ≤
n+n1∑
i=n+1
e2i
Since we know yi − uiβ?U ∼ N (0, σ), we know that for any parameter h > 1, we have Pr(ei ≤
2σ
√
log h) ≥ 1 − ch−2 for some constant c. Therefore, we know, with high probability (at least
1− ch−2), we have
C2 − 2√n− n1C(2σ
√
log h) ≤ C2 − 2C
√√√√ n∑
i=n+1
e2i
≤
n+n1∑
i=n+1
e2i
≤ n1(2σ
√
log h)2
Therefore, we have (
C − 2σ√n− n1
√
log h
)2
≤ n(2σ
√
log h)2
and thus
C ≤ 2σ
(√
n+
√
n− n1
)√
log h
Therefore, we know√∑n
i=n1
||ui(β?U − βU
∧
)||2
n− n1 ≤ 2σ
(
1 +
√
1
1− γ
)√
log h
We notice the right hand side of the above inequality does not depend on n, n1. Therefore, we take
n → +∞, and we know that n − n1 = (1 − γ)n → +∞, and apply the law of large numbers, we
have √
Eu
[
(u(β?U − βU
∧
))2
] ≤ 2σ(1 +√ 1
1− γ
)√
log h
where left hand side is the same as
√
Ex
[
(x(β
∧
− β?))2]. Then the conclusion of Lemma 1 is a
simple rearrangement of the above inequality.
C Proof of Theorem 6
We consider
`j =
n+n1∑
i=1
τ
(j)
i l(yi, fθ(j)(xi))
and
`′j =
n+n1∑
i=1
τ
(j)
i l(yi, fθ(j+1)(xi))
According to the algorithm, it is easy to see that
`j ≥ `′j ≥ `j+1
Therefore, `j is a monotonic decreasing sequence. Since a lower bound exists on the sequence, we
assume B = inf `j is the inferior of the sequence `j . Therefore, we know that
lim
j→+∞
`j −B = lim
j→+∞
|`j −B| = 0
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Further, we know that
0 ≤ |`j+1 − `j | ≤ |`j −B|
and thus
0 ≤ lim
j→+∞
|`j+1 − `j | ≤ lim
j→+∞
|`j −B| = 0
Therefore, we have
lim
j→+∞
|`j+1 − `j | = 0
Q.E.D.
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